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NEGATIVE AGREEMENTS AFFECTING LAND
THESIS PRESENTED FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF LAWS
BY
ROBERT HARPER MURRAY L.L.B.
CORNELL UNIVERSITY
JUNE 1897
I N T R 0 D U C 7 I ') N
In this thesis I have tried to investigate a field of Equitable
Jurisdiction which seems to have been either neglected or treated in
a very superficial manner by text books,and I have attempted,as far
as my ability would allow,to arrange in a systematic manner the
different phases of the sulbject of "Negative Agreements affecting
Land". In Chapter one I have tried to deal with the nature and
scope of these agreementsthe way in which the Court of Equity takes
cognizance of them,and the reason for its interference. In Chapter
two,the subject of rights of action has been fully treated,and the
effect that laches *has upon such rights. I have been able to
find littleif any,authority dealing with this branch of the ques-
tion in text books,while,on the other hand,there are many cases
which seem to temd to the conclusions I have reached and tried to
clearly express.
The cases,howeverdo not seem to fully distinguish between
the effect of covenants,restrictions,and easements; so I have taken
as the title of iny thesis "Negative Agreements affecting Land" with
the object of embracing these different terms in a word so generic
in its nature as "Agreement". This,howev r,does not mean that
have used the Words "Negative Agreements" throughout this treatise;
for,althiough,the terms,"Covenants"V'Restrictions" Etc,can be broadly
distinguished,it facilitated matters to use these terms synorymous-
ly,for so they seem to be employed in the leading cases on this
subject.
The following authorities furnished many u)seful suggestions,
and shed much light on the task I have tried to perform: Beach,
Modern Equity Jurisprudence; Bispham's Principles qf Equity,Fifth
Edition 1893; High on Injunction, Third Edition; arid Pomeroy's Equity
Jurisprudence ,Second Edition,1892.
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CHAPTER I
NATURE AND SCOPE OF NEGATIVE AGREEMEITS.
Definition. A concise definition of negative agreements may be
given in ihe following statement: Negative agreements or restric-
tions are stipulations concerning the use of land by which the owner
or any person possessing rights therein confines its use to certain
purposes.
The Court will look upon these restrictions,in many cases,as
easements,and therefore as such are for the benefit of the respec-
tive landowners,it is unnecessary to insert them in subsequent con-
veyances to bind the grantees who claim under such deeds. Barrow v
Richard (a) is cited as the case establishing this rule in Birdsall
v Tiemann (b). Justice Titchell says "The effect of such covenants
was considered and settled in Barrow v Richard,and the Chancellor
held that they created easements on the lands for the benefit of
thetr respective landowners. In that case there was no allegation
that the covenants were contained in the deed to the defendant; and
if an easement was created,it was unnecessary to insert them in
subsequent conveyances"
How these restrictions are created. A restriction on the use of
land may be created by grant or by covenant by the owner that he
shall refrain from using his premises in a particular manner. Reci-
procal restrictions of this character may be created upon the
Ta) 8 Paige (N.Y.) 35l_7-...... (b) 12 How.Pr.551
division and conveyances in severalty to different grantees of
an entire tract,and they may be created by a reservation in a
conveyance,by a condition which is annexed to a grant,or by a
covenant,and even a parol agreement of the grantees.(a)
Development of the law on this subject. Until late in this
century it seems that the Court would only exercise its equitable
jurisdiction where it was a covenant running with the land and the
plaintiff depended on his contractual right,and the defendant was
subject to a legal obligation which equity would enforce. If
there were no contractual relations between the parties equity
would not interpose a remedy. These opinions or dicta were,
howeverdiscredited in later cases,and we find the case of What-
man v Gibson(b),where a covenant against certain trades was en-
forced by an injunction against a purchaser of the land with
notice of the covenant,in which the learned judge said "1 Whatever
may be the form of the covenantor whatever difficulty there may
be in bringing an action on itI think there is a plain agreement
which the Court of Equity ought to enforce; and as the defendant
admits he intends to carry on one of the prohibited businesses,
he comes within the purview of the deedand ought to be restrained
from so doing by the injunction of the court".
Not necessary that the agreemnts should be in covenants run ing
with the land. It is not necessary therefore, 4 hat the covenant
whose enforcement is sought should run with the land so as to be
(a) Trustees v Lynch,70 N.Y.447. Carter v Ayrault,47 ',.Y.73,
Tallmadge v East River Bank,26 N.Y.105. (b) 9 Sim.196.
binding upon the purchasers. A case illustrative of this point
is Tulk v Moxhay(a) which held,that where there was a covenant
that no buildings should be erected on the gardens,thie purchasdr
with notice of the covenant that no buildings should be erected,(..,
Was bound by it in Equity whether he was bound at law or not,and
an injunction was granted to restrain him infringing the covenant.
Lord Cottenham observed here "The question is not whether the
covenant runs with the land,but whether a party shall be permitted
to use the land in a manner inconsistent with the contract entered
into by his vendorand w;ith notice of which he purchased.'
It would appear therefore that where a subsequent purchaser
buys with notice of the restriction,the Court treats the property
as impressed with a trust. It is contended to be a case of con-
structive trusts,and the intent of the parties will be looked
into as to whether they intended the contract to run with the
land or not,and it would seem from the cases examined that the
equity attaches in the same way as do trusts,and,like trusts
funds,may be followed until it comes into the hands of a bona fide
purchaser. As against the first purchaser the plaintiff would
rely on his contract,and against the subsequent purchaser with
notice of the restriction, the question would seem to be one of
trusts..
Nature of the agreement. There has been much difficulty,howeveq
to determine in the cases whether the agreement which the pur-
chaser has entered into is such that it creates an easenent,a
covenant,or a restriction. The cases are conflicting,but the
-(a) ifBeav.571 .-
weight of authority seems to point to the fact that these res-
trictions are regarded really as easements. They are equitable
easements which,by nature of some defect iT their creation or some
other factare not enforceable in a court of law. They are
defined as "a right without profit which the owner of land has
acquired by contract or estoppel to restrict or regulate,for the
benefit of his own property,the use and enjoyment of the land of
another" (a) In other cases,however,they are regarded as
merely coming under the doctrine of specific performance which
the court will enforce on the ground of the contractual relations
existing between the vendor and vendee,aid against the subsequent
purchaser on the ground that he had taken the land subject to the
trust that was attached to it by the predecessor in title. Viewing
the casehowever,in this way would not give the Court ground to
interfere on behalf of several purchasers of different parts of
a tract of land with whom no contract was made,but the Court will
often give relief to such persons. However it may still be
upheld as an obligation on a purely equitable ground,and it is
said that "the principle on which equity enforces the burden of
the covenant against an alienee is that of preventing the party
having acquired land with knowledge of the rights of another from
defeating such rightsand not upon the idea that the engagements
create easements which run with the land" (b).
Distinction between covenants,restrictions and easements.The law
Ta) Whitney'VUnio on Ry Co. 11 Gras (Maiss) 359
(b) Brewer v Marshall,19 N.J.Equity 537.
is that a covenant must be under seal,but a restriction may be
created by simple contract. Any kind of agreementaffirmative or
negative is binding by way of a covenant,but enforceable restric-
tions are practically limited to negative agreements. Also the
question whether the covenant runs itth the land,at law,depends
upon questions of privity of estate between the contracting
parties,but Equity does not take cognizance of such questions.
Notice is essential in the case of a restriction to a subsequent
purchaser,but a covenant runs regardless of such notice. An
easement is defined to be " a privilegewithout profit,which the
owner of one neighboring tenement has over another in respect of
their several tenements,by prescription or by grant; by which
the servient owner is obliged to suffer or not do something on
his own land,for the advantage of the dominant owner"(a)
Whether we regard the agreement as a covenanta restriction or
an easement~it seems that the Court will nevertheless enforce it
as between the grantor and the immediate grantee. Justice
Bigelow says " Nor can there be any doubt that in whatever form
such a restriction is placed on real estate by the terms of the
grantwhether it is in the technical form of a condition or
covenant,or fo a reservation or exception in the deedor by words
which give to the acceptance of the deed by the grantee the force
arid effect of a parol agreement,it is binding as between the
grantor,and the immediate granteeand can be enforced against him
by suitable process,both in law and equity"(b)
(a) Wolfe v Frost,4 Sand. Ch.72
(b) Whitney V Union Ry Co. (Supra)
Instances of breach of covenant and what constitutes such breach.
A great many cases are found which deal with the breach of coven-
ants forbidding the grantee from building beyond a certain line,
or prohibiting him from the erection of a dwelling which would be
offensive to the grantor. In all these cases Equity will res-
train the purchaser or his assigns with notice,from the violation
of the covenants. In Seymour v McDonald (a) the defendant bought
a lot from the plaintiff where it was unders#ood that a family
mansion would be placed on it. There were covenants by the
plaintiff to the effect that he would not use the lot in any way
which would be offensive to the occupant of the adjoining proper-
ty,which would tend to deteriorate and lessen its value,and would
not use it for a stone quarry. The defendant soon after used
the lot as a quarry,and also placed a wharf on the river front.
the Court held t1a t the d efendant had violated the covenant and
could be restrained. The erection of a "switchback railway'
has been held to come within a restrictive covenant entered into
by the grantee to the effect that no operative machirBry,hut or
tent,shall be fixed or fastened on the landinasmuch as such a
railway is both operative machinery and a chattel within the mean-
ing of the covenants. (b).
A case which seems to conflict with those examined is
that of Warden v Southeastern R.Co (c) where the defendant erected
(a) 4 Sand. Ch.502. See also Graham v Hite (1892) 20 S.W.506.
Attorney Genl v Algonquin Club,153 Mass 447. Foster v Fraser,
(1893) 3 Ch.158, Blakemore v Stanley (Mass) 33 N.E. 689. In re
Washington Monument Fund (1893) 154 Pa.St.621. Hutchinson v Ul-
rich (I11.1893) 34 N.E.556. Hobson v Cartwright (Ky) 20 S.WV.281.
(b) Chamberlyne v Collins (1894) 9 Rep. (Eng) 311.
(c) 9 Hare 489.
a building which exceeded the height stipulated by six feet. Hee
we see the Court exercised its discretion about granting the in-
junction,which would take the form of a mandatory one,and denied
the prayer of the plaintiff on the ground that no irreparable
injury was done by such excess,and in effect held that a small
excess in height above that authorized will not constitute groung
for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the use of the building
so erected,as here there was plainly no damage done by the plain-
tiff.
Each case therefore will depend upon attending circumstances,
and the jurisdiction of the Court of equity may be exercised for
their erifoecer:ent or refused according to its discretion (Trus-
tees v Thatcher)(a); but when the agreement is a just and honest
oneits judgment should not be in favor of the wrongdoer.
Exception to the general rule. We have the dictum of Lord
Chancellor Cottenham that "the question is not whether the covenat,
runs with the landbut whether a party shall be permitted to use
the land in a manner inconsistent with the contract entered into
by his vendorand with notice of which he purchased"; yet an ex-
ception to this rule would seem to exist when we read the case
of Austerberry v The Corporation of Oldham(g),where the court
refused to grant the injunction on the ground that the statement
of Lord Chancellor Cottenham is limited to restrictive covenants,
and that it would not be extended so as to bind in Equity a pur-
chaser who took with notice of a covenant to expend money on
repairs or otherwise which does not run with the land at law,or,
-(a) 87 N.Y.311. (b) Tulk -v Moxhay 2 Phili.774. (c)_ L.h.2 -Cn.D. -
750.
in other words,there is an exception made to the rule that the
covenant need not run with the land in those cases in which the
stipulation is for the performance of some positive act on the
land by either covenantor or covenantee. -Lord Justice Cotton
here said " It is not a covenant which the Court of Equity will
enforce; it will not enforce a covenant not running at law,when
it is sought to enforce the covenant in such a way as to require
the successors in title of the covenantor to spend money,and in
that way to undertake a burden upon themselves". Thus Tulk
v Moxhay can be distinguished from this case by the learned judge
continuing " The covenantor must riot use the property for a pur-
pose inconsistent with the use for which it was originally granted,
but in my opinion,a court of Equity does not and ought not enforce
a covenant binding only in Equity in such a way as to require the
successors of the covenantor himself,they having entered into no
covenant,to expend sums of money in accordance with what the ori-
ginal covenantor bound himself to do" (a)
Effect of the Statute of Frauds. Are restrictions affected by
the Statute of Frauds ? It has been decided by some cases that
such restrictions create an interest in lands,and if not in wri-
ting are void. The provisions of the Statute,however,can be
complied with,as in other caseswhen there is a part performance,
but such performance must be founded upon and referable solely to
the agreement. If the acts relied upon would have been done
whether there were any agreement or not,or might be referable to
(a) See also: Moreland v Cook,6 Eq.252, Haywood v Brunswick
Building Society,8 o.B.D.403
some other agreement,they will not relievethe case from the oper-
ation of the Statute.
The majority of cases,however,dealing with this subject
seem to hold that there may be a mere parol agreement and no
covenant,and yet the Court will grant an injunction against the
party who purchases the land with notice. This is on the
ground that no one purchasing the land with notice can be in a
different situation from that occupied by his grantor. The
agreement can therefore be written or oral. (a) If,however,
the vendors,previous to the conveyance,exhibit a plan of the pro-
perty which purports to grant the plaintiff more rights than he
actually has under the deed the plaintiff cannot secure an injunc-
tion against the vendor,for the plaintiff is bound by the written
contractand cannot therefore vary its terms. Hence the dis-
tinntion between the American case of Tallmadge v East River Bank
(b) ,and the English case of Squire v Campbell (c).. In the
former case,it was established by the evidence that there was a
parol contract which was collateral to the grant; in the latter,
the evidence adduced tended to vary the extent and. form of the
plan as described and embodied in the lease,and thus vary the
terms of the written contract.
Ta) Tulk v Moxhay,li Beav.571. Tallmadge v East River Bank,
26 N.Y. 105, Lenning v Ocean City Assocn,14 Stew.Eq.606.
Hills v Miller,3 Paige,254. Barrow v Richard (Supra), Trustees v
xLyhch,70'N.Y. 440, Knapp v Hall (1893) N.Y.Supp.42.
(b) Supradi)
(c) 1 M.& C. 458
Effect of the Rule aai'nst perpetuities. , The-Rule agai~t
Perpetutites,which governs limitations over to third persons,
has never been held applicable to conditionsthe right of entry
for the breach of which is reserved to the grantor or devisor
and his heirsand may be released by him or them at any time'7(al
Justice Bigelow in Whitney v Union Railway Co (b) says:
"Every owner of real property has the right so to deal with it
as to restrain its use by his grantees within such limits as to
prevent its appropriation to purposes which will impair "the
value or diminish he pleasure of the enjoyment of the land
which he retains. The only restriction on this right is,that
it shall be exercised reasonably,with a due regard to public
policy,and without creating any unlawful restraint of trade"
And again at page 566 he says "They do not restrict the alien-
ation of land. The owner of the fee can convey it at his
pleasure. They do not tend to perpetuity. The person who
is entitled to the rights or privileges created or secured by
the ,restrictions can,,tt any time,release them. They do not
impair the enjoyment of the property. This remains in the
respective parties according to their legal rights under the
contract and grant,in the same mapner as in the case of a right
of way,where one person owns the land,which he may use and
occupy,subject only to the enjoyment of the easement by him
who has the right of way over it.
TA) Tobey v Moore,120- Mass,450,Gray v Blancl-ard,8 Pick.284.
Austin v Cambridgeport Parish:21 Pick.215. Brattle Sq.Church
v Grant,3 Gray 142. French v Old South Society,106 Iass.479
Cowell v Springs Co. 100 U.S.55. (b) Supra.
Construction of these Covenants. It is a rule that restrictive
covenants are to be construed very narrowly,and the Court will
not enjoin an allege threatened breach without seeing that
such breach will come plainly within the provisions of the
covenantand construes the restriction so as to be as little
burdensome to the covenantor as possible,and the restriction
is held to be a personal right of the covenantee,unless the
contrary intention clearly appears. (a) In the case where
there is a general plan of land which is divided up into lots,
there is a presumption that the restriction was intended to
be appurtenant to that land (b)
Rights of a grantee hin land subject to a restrictive
covenant. The owvrer of an estate in fee may use it for any
purposes at his own pleasure,and he may alter it in any way.
If there is another person who has an easement in itthe owner
has still the beneficial use in it which he can exercise con-
sistently with the others enjoyment of the easement. (c)
Penalty and Liquidated Damages. There are many cases in which
a fixed sum of money is mentioned in the instrument as payment
for the breach of a covenatt. In such cases the courts are
(a) Keats v Lyon 4 Ch.App. 218.
Badger v Boardman,16 Gray 559. Clark v Jamnnes,87 Hun.215.
(b) Tobey v Moore,130 Mass 450
called on to find out whether this was meant as liquidated
damages or as a penalty. In case it is a penalty the
Court will not be deprived in the exercise of its equitable
jurisdiction,but will exercise it as in their discretion it
seems fit. (a) It does not follow that because a penalty
is fixed on the breach of a restriction that this authorizes
the party to do the act. However,if it is clearly
shown that the parties intended to regard the amount in ques-
tion as liquidated damages,the Court will not grant the injun-
ction,but leave the parties to their remedy at law. It does
not follow that because the parties used in the instrument the
term "penalty" or "liquidated damages" that the court will
always construe the contract to mean that in using the word
"penalty" that it was intended to secure the faithful perfor-
mance of the covenant,or that in using the words "liquidated
damages" the contract was to be interpreted to mean that it
was to be paid as a equivalent for doing the act forbidden. (b)
Form of RemedZ. Whenever there is a threatened breach of
covenant,the form of remedy should be a prohibitory injunction.
Where the breach is already made,the injunction assumes a
(a) Bird v Lake,l Hem. & M.111
(b) Phoenix Ins. Co. v Continental Ins. Co. 87 N.Y.400.
National Bank of England v Marshall,L.R. 40 C.D.112.
mandatory formand in all cases where a purchaser erects buil-
dings beyond a line fixed by the covenantsit is proper to
grant an injunction in such form (a)
The breach of a negative covenant will sometimes be in-
ferred from circumstances(b),thus following the dictum of Lord
StLeonards -in the nature of a digression- in the famous case
('c)
of Lumley v Wagner with regard to the service of an actress,
" I am of opinion,that if she had attempted even in the absen-
ce of any negative stipulation to perform at another theatre,
she would have broken the spirit and true meaning of the con-
tract as much as she would now do with reference to the contrat
into which she has actually entered" This statement of the
law,as far as personal services are concerned,has,however,been
disapproved of in the the case of Whitwood Chemical Co. v Hard-
man ,upon the merits of which we need not now enter. (d)
When an Iniunction will be granted. When the Court of
Equity sees that it ought to exercise this jurisdiction of
granting an injunction,it will not regard the way it will
affect the parties to the contract,but it only looks on the
terms of the contract.') A case illustrativd of this point
(a) Lord manners v Johnson,l C.D. 673.
Rankin v Huskisson,4 Sim.13.
(b) Newman v Nellis,97 N.Y. 285
(c) 1 DeG. M.& G. 604.
(d) 1891,2 Ch.416.
is found in Tipping v Eckersley (a),where the defendant entered
into a covenant not to interfere with the use of the water of
a stream which was used by plaintiff for his mill. The
damage was shown to amount to very little,yet Vice-Chancellor
Wood intimated that such a fact would not have weight with the
Court in the exercise of their right to grant an injunction.
His views may be briefly stated in the following abstract: "If
the construction of the instrument thk intr~umnt be clear
and the breach clear,then it is not a question of damagebut
the mere circumstances of the breach affords sufficient ground
for the court to interfere by injunction. And I apprehend
the Court may so interfete whether the defendant has or has
not actually committed the breach in respect of which the
interference of the Court is sought. For in the case of
contract,it is enough if the defendant claims and insists on a
right to do the act,although he has not already done it moda
et forma as alleged. In such a case I should have no difficul-
ty in granting the injunction Provided the restriction is
of some substantial value,any breach will be enjoined unless
so trivial as to come within the principle de minimis (b)
Qualification to above statement. There must however be
a qualification to what has been said in the preceding para-
graph. The Court,as later cases show,will only exercise
this absolute jurisdiction when the covenants on which they
base the decree are clear and free from doubt,and their con-
templated or actual violation is established,and there is
(a) 2 Kay & J.264. (b) Attorney Genl v Algonquin,153 X..s47
likely to ensue irreparable injury. If this does not exist
the Court will be governed by the effect the injunction will
have on the parties. In Wilkinson v Rogers (a) there was
a lease of a house which contained accovenant by the lessee
to use it as a private dwelling house only,with a proviso that
if any of the adjoining premises belonging to the lessor,were
converted into a shop,the lessee should be at liberty to con-
vert his premises to a similar use. The plaintiff usedor
allowed to be used,the adjoining premises as a place for
selling photographs. Lord Justice Turner said " I agree
that if the covenant is clear and distinct,and irreparable
injury is likely to accrue from it,it is the duty of the Court
to interfere by injunction before the hearing. On the other
hand,if the covenants are not clearly expressed,or if it is
doubtful whether a breach has actually been comiitted,or if
no irreparable injury is likely to be occasioned either to
one side or to the other,then,I thinkthat according to the
whole course of this Court,it becomes a question of compara-
tive injury -on which side would greater injury be caused ?".
Therefore the objects sought to be secured by the restric-
tive covenants must be certain and clearly expressed in their
provisions. This is a rule fixed by the Court of Equity in
(a) 12 W.R. 284.
order to protect the defendant from injunctions in cases where
the restrictions are vague in their prohibition,and where the
effect would be to leave the defendant in doubt as to what was
the real order of the Court,and in what circumstances he would
be liable to imprisonment for disobeying the order of the
Court. Where an injunction is ambiguous and indefinite and
gives no clear rule of conductit becomes a snare to the defen-
dant which,if he violates,tenders him liable to imprisonment.
The Court will,therefore,in granting an injunction take care
that the language of its order will be quOh thhtit is quite
plain what it permits and what it prohibits.
Equity will interfere where the breach is intended, :ut in such
a case the intention must be clear and manifest..
Reason for the interference of 2ourts of Equity. The remedy
by injunction is given by the Courts -which really has the c.-
effect of decreeing the specific performance of the agreements-
where. it would seem that the plaintiff had a remedy at law in
damages. In such cases,however,the interference of the
Court is based on the ground that there would be a multiplicity
of suits were the plaintiff denied the injunction. An
illustration of t-is is Stewart v Winters (a) -,-here it was a
bill by a lessor to restrain his lessee from using the premises
demised as an auction store,the lease containing a covenant
(a) 4 Sandf. Ch.587.
that the store should be only occupied for a certain purpose
which impliedly excluded that of auctioneering. Vice-Chancel-
lor Sandford referring to the legal remedy said " In the first
place it is manifest that at law a new cause of action might
arise every day that the defendants sell at auction. If the
lessor avail himself of his full rights at law he will sue
daily for the damages. This would lead to a multiplictiy
of suits,harrassing to both parties and highly obnoxious to
the censure of a court of Equity" ±1e further observes that
it would be hardly possible to estimate the actual damages.
There would be the opinions of the jury which might vary
done
greatly as to the amount of the injury,to the property as the
damages would be very conjectural,or!zome night think it en-
hanced itd value,while others might consider the damages so
great as to render their ascertainment a matter of the greatest
difficulty.
CHAPTER I I
RIGHITS OF ACTION.
A. Who may exercise such, and
B. How they may be lost.
The question now arises as to who is entitled to the
relief in Equity for breach of these negative agreements.
So far we have seen the grantor and grantee have enforced
their respective rights on breach of covenar-ts 'by reason of
the privity of contract existing between them (a),and it is
fitting now to ask whether the Court will also protect those
who claim under the grantees who have not entered into any
contract with the grantor. The most important point to be
settled,however,is whether lot owners who claim from a common
grantor can enforce negative covenants against one or more of
their number on a threatened or actual breach,when there ate
no reciprocal covenants existing as between themselves. The
rule that the Court will grant an injunction on the threatened
or actual breach of a covenant as against the original parties
to the agreement and their assigns is so well settled (b),that
the greater part of this chapter will investigate the question
(a) Duke of Bedford v Trustees of British Museum,2 1' & K'513
(b) Clements v W.rellesL.R.l Eq.199.
Trustees of Columbia College v Lynch,70 1,T.Y.440
Spencer's Case, 3 Coke 16
Peck v Conway,119 JTass 546.
whether an injunction will be granted against parties who are
not bound by privity of contractand between whom there is
no contractual relationship.
The rule of law seems to be settled that w-1ere the
action is brought by the original covenantee against a sub-
sequent purchaser from the covenantor for breach of covenant
that the Court will enforce the covenant against such sub-
sequent purchaser with notice. When however the question
arises as to the right of a grantee of one part of the land
to enforce a restrictive covenant made by his grantor upon
the sale of another part,a different problem is presented. In
ttistcaselit might.be-that the grantor made the restrictive
covenant in order to secure a personal benefit or to enhance
the Value of a particular piece of land. If the restriction
is not in the nature of a legal right,then the question which
influences the Court of Equity is whether,on entering into
this restrictive covenant,it was intended that this restriction
should enure to the benefit of this particular grantee.
General Plan Theory. The case of Whatman v Gibson(b) gives
us grounds for saying that when,from the facts surrounding the
conveyances to different grantees,it can be inferred that the
different conveyances were part of a general plan for the
improvement of the whole tract of land,then each of the
(a) Keates v Lyon,L.R.4 Ch. App. 218.
Master v Hansard,4 Ch.D. 718.
(b) 9 Sim.196.
grantees of smaller divisions has such an interest in preser-
ving the property according to the intent of the restrictions,
that the Court will grant an injunction to prevent the viola-
tion of the covenants. The plan or general scheme is
sufficient notice to subsequent purchasers of the object of the
restriction,and they take subject to an obligation to observe
these stipulations imposed fot the purpose of carrying the
plan into effect for the common benefit. Consequently,
these contracts need not be express~but may be implied from
the transaction of the sale and purchase(a),and although ithe
agreement in a deed may be regarded as a contract merely
binding on the original parties,the Court will construe it so
as to carry out the intention of the parties,arn regard it as
being in the nature of an incorporeal hereditament or easement
remaining and attached to the land in question. Where it
appears,therefore,from a fair interpretation of the instrument
that it was the intention to reserve a right in the rture
of an easement in the property granted,for the benefit of
other land owned by the grantor,such a restriction will be
deemed to be appurtenant to the land,and this will be binding
on all subsequent purchasers of the same lot of land (b).
Obligations on Grantees. Each grantee of a part of the land
is bound to observe whatever restrictions may be imposed on
--a) Renals v C0owiishaw,-9 Ch.. 5 .......
Spicer v I..artin,14 App. Cas.12.
(b) Whitney v Union Ry. (Supra)
his lot for the benefit of the others,and can claim the same
right against the other grantees. And it matters not whether
such a party uould maintain an action at law to enforce such a
covenant. The Court will exercise its jurisdiction in
favor of such a party when the restrictions were intended for
his benefit and protection..(a)
Reason for apparent burden on Purchasers. The rule appears
to be that a covenant entered into with the grantor not only
binds the original grantee,but,where the land is sold in lots,
each purchaser,under certain circumstances,may claim the bene-
fit of the restriction against the other purchasers. This
seems somewhat anomalous,but on examining the authorities
carefully the justice of the rule appears,for many times per-
sons will be induced to purchase land which they know can only
be used for purposes of residenceas also is the case with
regard to the neighboring land,where,were there no restrictions,
they would never think of purchasing. It is very important
for the grantor or vendor of the lots tb see that the sale of
one or more should not impair the value and prejudice the sale
of the rest; therefore they take care to lay the purchasers
under restrictions as to the use they may make of the lot,and
in this way they encourage the erection of residences and en-
hance the value of the land,that might otherwise be depreciated
were they to allow all sorts of buildings to be erected that
might become a source of annoyance. Since,in many cases,the
original vendor parts will all the lots,it follows that he has
Ta) Hfils v Miller,3 Paige 256...
,atertown v Cowen,4 Paige 510
Barrow v Richard (Sunra)
no more interest in the use of the land,nor can the aggreived
purchasers force him to bring an action against the person who
has broken the covenants,and hence the remedy is given at the
suit of any of the purchasers. (a)
Eastwood v Lever.(b) An instructive case,and one which deakY
with the questions already raised in this thesisis that of
Eastwood v Lever. The defendant in this case,a grantee,
erected a building contrary to a covenant entered into with
the grantor. The plaintiff,a grantee from the same grantor,
sought to enforce this restrictive covenant although it had
not been entered into with him. The Court determined that
the plaintiff had arequity against the defendant,and in effect
held that w',en land is sold in building lots,the conveyance
containing certain restrictive covenants,each purchaser has
an equity against the other to compel the faithful observance
of the conditions.
Rights as between Lesseeand Lessor. A good authority for
adopting the rule that the Court should interfere to restrain
the breach of a negative covenant where there is a common
scheme is found in the case of Hudson v Cripps (c),where an
injunction was granted to restrain the conversion into a club,
of a large part of a building,adapted for the occupation of
tenants,at the instance of a .enant who held under an agreement
in a common form, binding the lessees to rules suitable to
buildings erected as residences. Justice North here says
it
-T) Barrow v Richard,8 Paige 351.
(b) 33 L.J.Ch.
(c) '96 1 Ch.265.
"No one can read these provisions without seeing that there
was a scheme for the general management of this building,
composed of several flatsin such a way as to be suitable to thQ
convenience of all the persons who should be tenants of the
respective flats x : x x x x Where the landlord enters into
such an arrangement with each tenant~it is obviously intended
to be and is,as a matter of fact,for the benefit of all the
tenants. Whether this house was built originally with any
such scheme in view I do not know,and it seems to me entirely
unimportant. There were,at any rate,existing a collection
of flats,each occupied in a similar mannerunder a common
mqnagement,by different tenants7 The learned judge based
his decision on the cases of Renals v Cowlishaw and Spicer
v Martin(a)
Rights as between grantee and fgrantor. The rights of a
grantee against the grantor are established in the late case
of Birmingham & District Land Co.v Allday (b),where a land
company directed to be sold by auction a property which was
divided into lots,and described as "a small freehold estate
divided into twenty-two convenient lots of sound building
sites? There was a plan which showed how the whole piece
of land was to be laid out,and the position and boundaries of
the lots. The purchaser covenanted that he would build
none but dwelling houses on the lot,and that it would not cost
him less than two hundred and fifty pounds,and that he should
follow the plan as enforced on the other lands of the vendor.
a C.1,4A.a.---------------------------------------
La) 9 C-ID-1252 14 App.Cas-12, (b) '93 1 Ch.342.
The part which was put up for sale only formed a portion of the
estate of the vendors,and at the auction only a small number of
the lots were sold. One lot was purchased by Allday who
refused to complete the purchase on learning that the vendors
were going to sell the remainder of the lots free from the res-
trictive conditions,and the action was brought to determine
the validity of the claims of the vendors and the rights of
the vendee..
Justice Stirling cited with approval Martin v Spicer (a)
and The Nottingham Patent Brick Co. V Butler (b),and upheld
the General Plan theory. It was held that Allday,the vendee-
was entitled to the benefit of the contract by the vendors
implied in the conditions of sale,that they would,as to the
lots unsold at auction,observe Wtipulations similar to those
which the purchasers of those lots,had they been sold,would
have been bound by covenant to observe; and that the conveyance
to him ought to contain an expression of such an obligation
on the part of the vendors. The learned Justice says " It
seems to me,thereforethat these particulars and conditions
constituted (in the language of Lord MacNaghten in Spicer v
Martin) an invitation to the public to come in and purchase on
the footing that the whole property offered for sale was to
be bound by one general law affecting the character of the
-a) L.R.14 App.Cas.12
(b) The Nottingham Patent Brick & Tile Co.v Butler,16 Q.B.D.784
buildings to be erected thereon; and that the vendors ought
not to be considered at liberti, to destroy, the value of that
which was sold,by authorizing the use of a part of the property
for a purpose inconsistent with the law by which they imported
to bind the whole'
Rights as between grantees and purchasers. The rights of
a purchaser of one residential lot against another who impli-
edly buys with notice of a general scheme,although there was
no deed of mutual covenants to be executed by each purchaser
and no restrictive covenant except that contained in the
general plan,are discussed and settled in the late case of
Tindall v Castle(a). Here the defendant was restrained at
the suit of purchasers of some of the other residential lots
from builoing cottages on a piece of land marked "lodge" ,which
by a building scheme or plan could only be used for that
purpose. Justice North held that the defendant bought with
notice of the general Ilan or scheme which was intended to
represent to purchasers that this particular piece of land was
to be used only for a lodge,and therefore he should be restrain#-
ed from building these cottages or using the land for any pur-
pose inconsistent with the scheme disclosed by the plan.
Meaning of the term "Assigns". The question was raised in
a recent English case (b),whether when a large building es-
tate has been offered for sale in plots,under an agreement that
the purchaser would not alter the buildings on the plot he
purchased "without the consent in writing of the vendorhis
Ta) (1893) 62 L.J.Ch.555 (b) '92 3 Ch-148, Everett v Reming tOi
heirs or assigns",but there is no general building scheme
governing the whole estate,and the purchaser of the plot,al-
though he has entered into a covenant in the terms provided
by the form of agreement,is not bound to obtain the consent of
the purchaser of another plot which has been subsequently sold
and conveyed,before he can alter the buildings on his own
plot. In the case above cited,the facts briefly stated
were: the estate,in question,was being sold in lots at differeta
times for building purposes,and certain restrictive covenants
were entered into. Remington,the defendant,purchased the
house and garden in which he carried on a school. The defen-
dant had covenanted with Durrant the vendor"his heirs and
assigns" that such covenant should run with the landand that
he,the defendantwould not "without the consent of Durrant his
heirs or assigns" alter the buildings &c,or suffer anything
to be done which might be a nuisance to Durrant his heirs or
assigns or his or their tenants in the neighborhood.
Subsequently an adjoining house and garden were conveyed to
Everett,the plaintiff,by a previous purchaser from Durrant,
which were subject to similar restrictive covenants.
Remington erected a school-room,and Everett brought action,
claiming an injunction for the nuisance caused by the school,
and also because the new building was erected without his
consent as an "Assign" of Durrant. The Court would not
grant relief on the ground that Everett was not an "Assign",
and had no groun4 for seeking a remedy in a court of Equity.
It mYlst be noted that the case did not decide that a
neighboring purchaser cannot enforce his rights when there
has been a breach of covenants,against another,but assumed
that even if the plaintiff in such a case was entitled to en-
force the restrictive covenant,there was no breach,and because
the consent required was that of the original vendor,and the
words "consent of George Durrant,his heirs and assigns" ,meant
the consent of the owner for the time being of the estate iri
its broad and popular sense,and not of every subsequent lessee
or purchaser of a plot.
Limitatioi to the right of action of grantees.It would seem
therefore to be established from cases cited,and the absence
of dissenting opinions,that the right of grantees who have
bought property from a common grantor to enforce against each
other covenants entered into by each of them with the grantor,
is restricted to cases where it is established that there is
a general plan for the improvement of the property,and the
coven-at has been entered into by all the purchasers,and for
the benefit of each of them,and the party has bought the pro-
perty with notice of such plan. (a)
Quialification to General plan Theory. A limitation to the
general plan theory is that where there is a sale of building
As to meaning of term "adjoining" see Harrison v Good,ll Eq.
Cas.338.
(a) Mulligan v Jordan,0 1 .J.Eq.363
Muzzarelli v Hulshizer,(1894) 163 Pa. St.
Fielden v Slater,L.R.7 Eq.523.
estate in plots,where the vendor shows a plan that contains
the proposed sites of lots and the situations of the houses
which should occupy them,and a printed fDrm of the agreement
for the purchasewhich has spaces for alterations,the purchaser
is not entitled,in the absence of further representations to
assume that the whole estate is governed by a building scheme
or plan which follows wholly Phat laid down in the plan.
This is not at all in conflict with cases already
discussed,as it is expressly laid down by Justice Romer in the
case which is authority for the above statement of the law (a)
that the plaintiffs would be entitled to judgment if they
could also show that such a scheme,if there was onewas commu-
nicated to them,or that they were led to believe in the exis-
tence of such a scheme,and that the intention was that each one
of the seVeral purchasers of the different lots should be bound
and also lave the benefit of the covenants which were entered
&ndo by each of the other purchasers. (b)
What constitites notice to subsequent purchasers. It may
well be asked now: What is sufficient to constitute notice
to a subsequent purchaser ? It has been held that construc-
tive notice is sufficient,and if a defendant claims derivitive-
ly under a grantif a deed is duly registered,the defendant
is deemed to have notice of its stipulationsand is bound to
--Ta) Tucker- v Vowles,9 5 Ch.195 - -
(b) Davies v Leicester, '94 2 Ch,208.
De Gray v Monmouth Beach Club ITose,24 Atl. Rep.388
Graham v Hite (1893) 20 S.W. (Ken) 506.
observe the restrictions which are imposed on the enjoyment
of the land (a) Again it has been held (b),that where
houses were all erected according to a general plan and uni-
formly,that this uniformity was sufficient to put the defendant
upon inquiry,and that he should be charged with notice.
Intention a governingpinciple. A party seeking relief in
the Court for breach of covenant,where no privity of contract
exists between the parties to the action,must be able to show
that the restriction was intended to benefit his property and
not merely that of the original covenantee (c) Lord Escher
is authority for the dictum "1 x x when an estate is put up
for sale in lots,subject to a condition that restrictive
covenants are to be entered into by each of the purchasers
with the vendor,and the vendor is intending ab that sale to
sell the whole of the property,the question,whether it is
intended that each of the purchasers shall be liable in respect
of those restrictive covenants to each of the other purchasers,
is a quespion of fact,to be dtermined by the intention of the
vendor,and not of the purchasers,and that question must be
determined on the same rules of evidence as every other question
(a) Whitney v Union Ry Co. 11 Gray 366...
(b) Tailmadge v East River Bank,26 N.Y.105
See also Uoreland v Cook,L.R.6 Eq.252, Kna
Knapp v Hall (1893) N.Y.Supp.42
(c) Parker v Nightingale,6 Allen,341.
Tod-Ileatly v Barham,L.R.4 C.D.80
(d) Nottingham Patent Brick & Tile Co v Butler,16 Q.B.D.770.
of intention. And if it was found that it was the intention
that the purchasers should be bound by covenants inter se,the
Court of Equity will,in favor of any one of the purchasers,
insist upon the performance of the covenants by any other of
them and will do so without introducing the vendor into the
mat t er"
From the above dictum one would be led to infer that
the s&le of the whole property must be consummated at one
time to establish conclusively hat the intention of the
vendor was that all the purchasers should be benefited by the
restrictions,as such a disposition of the property would clear-
ly prove that the vendors did not impose the restrictions for
his own benefit. The learned judge however says " x x it is
impossible,in my opinion,to say that the mere fact that the
lots were not all sold on one day can make any difference.
Lapse of time is not of itself a bar to the liability of the
purchasers inter se; it is a matter to be taken into consider-
ation,but it is not a bar.'
Inferences to be drawn from the cases. As is seen by
the preceding paragraph intention seems to be a governing
principle in helping the Court to construe the object of a
restriction. As a consequence there may be two separate
and distinct kind of cases. The fitst may be found where
there has been a sale of part of the property,when the vendor
has no intention of selling the restbut he afterwards deter-
mines to sell the remaining block. In this case you cannot
hold the restrictions binding on the first sale as also fixed
on the second conveyanceand you can only look at the condit-
ions relating to the second sale. The second class of cases
is where the entire property is put up for sale in lots subject
to restrictions. Here it is purely a question of fact whether
it was or was not intended that the restrictive covenants should
be entered into for the benefit of each of the purchasers
against the others,and here,as was said before,it is very
material whether the vendor reserves any property for himself,
and if he does not reserve any part that is almost conclusive
evideica that the covenants which he takes from the purchasers
are intended for the benefit of each purchaser which may be
enforced against the others.
B. How rights of action may be lost.
Effect of Acquiesconce and Change in Locality. .A person
who has a right to enforce a covenant prohibiting the carry-
ing on of a trade or business upon certain\ands,may lose that
right by acquiescing in the regular breaches of the covenant,
or by changes in the character of the building estate. If,
howeverthere is a part of the building estate remote from the
plaintiffs property on which business has.been carried on in
breach of the covenant,this is not proof of acquiescence by
him unless it was know what was being done. The change in the
character of the property must be so complete as to make the
object for which the covenant was imposed impossible of
attainment\ ta ceprive the plaintiff of his right(a).The rule
in Equity regarding the time of bringing action to compel a
compliance with covenants,is,that it must be commenced promptly
and before the persons in possession of the land have expended
morley or incurred liabilities in erecting buildings on the
land. It would be unequitable to allow a party to lie by
and see acts done which would involve expense to others,and
then to permit him to enforce his rights,and injure,very
materially,persons acting in good faith.(b)
Dulke of Bedford v Trustees of British Museum. The early and
historical case in which the question as to the validity and
force of these restrictions are questioned is that of the
Duke of Bedford v Trustees of the British museum (d). Here
there was a conveyance in fee made of certain lands in the
city of London,and the feoffee covenanted not to use the land
in a particular manner with a view to the more ampleoenjoyment
of the adjoining lands,by the feoffor; and,afterwards,by the
voluntary acts of the faoffor and those claiming under him,
the character and condition of the adjoining land had boon
so greatly altered that the contemplated benefits were entire-
ly gone. The court refused to interfere to compel a specific
performance by injunction,and left the party to his rememdy
TaY--Knight- v simmonds,1896 2 Ch.294.
Jackson v Stevenson, (1892) 156 Mass 496.
(b) Whitney v Union Ry Co. 11 Gray 367.
(d) 2 M & K 563.
at law on the covenant. Lord Eldon,in giving the judg-
ment of the court said "If this deed is permitted to be urged
the
against what I must call,not the legal,but Aactual intention,
and if you have the means of obtaining any remedy,you may have
recourse to that deed,but you cannot under such circumstances,
come into a Court of Equity for a remedy which the Court never
grants except in cases where it would be strictly equitable to
grant it. It is impossible to state,as the doctrine of the
Court of Equity that the Court will carry into execution a
specific covenant in all cases where the legal intention of
the deed is found.'
What will constitutte waiver of covenants. A great many
instlnces arise where a grantee has covenanted not to carry on
a certain trade or business upon the premises leased,or to use
them to the annoyance or injury of any of the houses on the
estate. The case which deals with this phase of the question
is Kemp v Sober(a),which,on a cursory examination,would seem to
conflict *ith the British M.useum case. In Kemp v Sober the
owner of an estate covered it with houses and sold some of
them subject to a covenant not to carry on any trade or allow
them to be used to the annoyance or injury of any of the
houses on the estate. It was held that the carrying on of
a girls school,in one of the houses was a breach of the coven-
ant,and that the covenantee had not waived the behefit of the
1 Sim. N.S. 520
covenant,though he had permitted other houses held under like
covenants to be used as schoold. The distinctionhowever,
was drawn between this and the British Museum case,as in the
latter there was a permanent change in the estate,and the
purposes for which the covenant was originally entered into
were gone by reason of the British Mluseum having been built
on the sitebut in Kemp v Sober,although the covenantor had
allowed some of the houses to be used as schoolsthey would
become private houses again as soon as they ceased to be used
as schools.
Where an injunction will be refused. An illustration of a
case where an injunction wbuld be refused is given in the
dictum of Lord Chancellor Eldon in Barret v Blagrave(6,where he
says " May not a very different question be made: whether if
you have permitted this to go on for eleven years,you must not
take your chance at law ? i have not the least doubt that
what is stated in the affidavits is within the term of the
covenant; but the question is whether you can have a specific
performance under such circumstances,the parties having from
the execution of the lease,eleven years ago,permitted that
covenant to stand an ineffective part of the lease. I rather
doubt whether,so far from the Court's interfering at -our
instance,a bill might not be filed to prevent your suing at
law upon that ,.covenant. If there are equitable circumstan-
ces to prevent your taking your legal remed$,surely they will
prevent your having a specific performance
-a) 6 
-Vese,,-!o4
Sayers v Collyer. A case somewhat similar to ti-at of the
Duke of Bedford v Trustees of the British Museum is Sayers v
Collyer (a). Here a building estate was sold in lots and the
vendee coverianted with the vendors and the owners of the
adjoining lots that he would not build a shop on his land or
carry on any trade there. The purchaser of one of the lots
brought an action against the defendant who was using his
house as a beer shop,to restrain him from breaking his covenant
The plaintiff had known that the defendant had carried on this
business for three years previous to bringing action,and there
was also evidence that buildings contiguous thereto had been
for some time used as shops notwithstanding the covenant. The
lot,when it was bought by the defendant had on it what appeared
to be a beer shop,which the defendant undertook Po use as such.
The defendant did not dispute either that the restrictive coven-
ants bound him or that the plaintiff could enforce them,but
the defence was set up on the special circumstances which exis-
ted. It was said that the covenants had lost their use by
lapse of time and change of eircumstances; that the preserving
of the estate as a residential property had become impossible,
and that the plaintiff had so far acquiesced in the change
as to buy his own beer at the defendant's shop for a long time
before he commenced the action. Therefore it was urged
that the plaintiff should be denied the injunction asked for.
(a) 24 C.D. 180.
Justice Pearson founds his judgment in this case entirely on
the authority of the British Museum adjudication,and in effect
laid down that the character of the property had so changed
that the original purpose -that of keeping the property as a
residential one- had failed,and that owing to these changes it
would be inequitable to enforce the specific performance of the
cove~ianit. He thought the action was not bought bona fide,
and therefore dismissed it with costs.
Criticism of Sayers v Collyer. The precise grounds on
which Justice Pearson arrived at his conclusion are not very
clear. He said that the British Museum case was ample
authority for his decision. This case of Sayers v Collyer
differs,however,from the nritish Museum case,in that the
breaking of the covenants which had made the original object
and purpose of them impossible had been brought about by the
covenantee himself,the then plaintiff or his predecessors in
title; whereas,in the present case,the plaintiff had not taken
any part in the erection of the beershop on defendant's lot.
The case however seems to have been decided on the ground that
it would be impossible to raise the property out of the state
into which it had been allowed to lapseand to restore it to
the condition contemplated by t-.e covenants,irrespective of
whether the plaintiff had any hand in bringing the property to
its present condition. Some stress was also laid onnthe
acquiescence of the plaintiff in the breach 6f the covenants
which was shown by his having bought his own beer at defendAnts
shop,and by his having seen other shops opened close at hand
by various persons without taking any proceedings against them.
In most of the cases examined so far,however,such a degree
of acquiencence would not have barred the plaintiff from his
equitable relief. Here the acquiescence is something less
than three years. It did not induce the other side to spend
money or place himself in an altered position,which would not
as a rule constitute a sufficient ground for refusing relief to
which the plaintiff would otherwise be entitled. However,
the learned judge seemed to think that there was mala fides
existing in the prosecution of the action: "I core therefore
to the conclusion that the action is not brought bona fide
for the purpose of stopping the use of the defendant's house
as a beershop,because it is no injury either to the plaintiff
or to the persons living in his immediate neighborhood in the
same block,but there is some other reason which I do not know,
which has induced the plaintiff in the year 1882 to complain
of that of which he did not complain three years before" It
might be urged that the learned judge was not explicit enough
in his reasons,but that the motives ougght not only to be known
but it should also be shown to have actuated the plaintiff's
conduct.
Summary of the Cases on Acquiescence and Change Locality. From
a critical study of the cases bearing on the effect of acquies-
cence on the part of the grantorin breaches of covenants,or
or changes due to the locality and surrounding propert, the
conclusion may be arrived at that an injunction to enforce
a covenant will not be grart ed where the grantor has made
or permitted riaterial changes to be made in the property,and
by which the purposesof the original covenant were nullified,
and it would be very oppressive for the Court to enforce the
covenant or agreement. This question may arise in different
ways:
1. Where the grantor has himself made material changes
in the property,
2. Where he has allowed other covenantors to break
their agreement
3. Where there is a material change in the condition of
the locality.
1. Where the grantor has himself made material changes in the
property,the British Museum case may be cited as an example,
w',ere the grantor built on a large part of the property which
by the original intention was not neant as a place for the
erection of buildings. The Itaned judge here said that
recourse should be had,if any,to law and "the question is
whether from the altered state of the property,altered by the
act of the party himself,he has not thereby voluntarily waived
and abandoned all that control which was applicable to the
property in its former state".(a)
See also Lattimer-v Livermore,72 N.Y.174
Stephens v Hockme',er (l 92) 19 N.Y.Sup.666
Green v Richmond, (1893) 29 N.E.770, and cases ante.
2. Where the grantor has allowed other covenantors to break
their agreement. Here it is found that the question of
acquiescence will have much weight with the Court,and if such
is shown to be the case,in any great degree,an injunction wAll
not be granted to restrain the breach. This is put on the
ground that no breach should be permitted which would destroy
all the benefit that would otherwise be enjoyed by the parties
to the agreement. In Roper v Williams (a) an injunction was
refused to restrain the breach of a covenant that buildings
shoulu be erected according to a general plan,as the covenantee
had previously acquiesced in a change in the property not con-
templated by the original covenants,and to restrain the breach
of which he had not made an immediate application to the Court.
It also establishes the rdfle that a landlord Wno relaxes in
favor of some of his tenants a covenant entered into for the
beenfit of all,is not entitled to an injunction to restrain
the other tenants from infringing the covenant. Lord Chan-
cellor Eldon said " In every case of this sort,the party in-
jured is bound to make immediate application tot the Court in
the first instance; and cannot permit money to be expended by
a person even though he has notice of the covenant,and then
apply for an injunction. Taking all the circumstances
together,the permission to build contrary to the covenant,
and the laying by,four or five months,before filing the bill,
(a) I T.& R.18
this is not a case in which a Court off Equity ought to in-
terfere by injurnction,but the plaintiff must be left to his
remedy at law: (a)
If the defendant relies on a waiver of the covenants
he must be prepared and able to show to the satisfaction of the
Court that this was a material violation of the covenant.
Justice James in German v Chapman (b) after reviewing the
.authorities,commented on the British Museum case to the
effect "If there is a general scheme for the benefit of a
great number of personsand then either by permission or
acquiescence,or by a long chain of things,the property has
been entirely or so substantially changed as that the whole
character of the place or neighborhood has been so altered that
the whole object for which the covenant was originally entered
into must be considered to be at an end,tnen the covenantee is
not allowed to come into the Court for the purpose of ierely
larassing and annoying some particular man where the Court
could see he was not doing it bona fide for the purpose of
effecting the object for which the covenant was originally
entered into! Then the learned judge turned to the case
before him,which was for the breach of a covenant,in erecting
a girls' school,that "No house or other building to be erected
or built upon the land whall be used or occupied otherwise than
(a) See also Eastwood v Lever,4 DeG. J & S 114
Peek v Matthews,2 Eq.515.
(b) 7 C.D.271.
as and for a private residence only,and not for any purpose
of trade",and proceeded "that is very different from the case
we have before us,where the plaintiff says that in one par-
ticular spot far away from this place,and not interfering at
all with the general schemehe has,under particular circumstan-
ces,allowed a waiver of the covenant. I think it would be
a monstrous thing to say that nobody could do an act of kind-
ness,or that any vendor of an estate who had taken covenants
of this kind from several persons could not do an act of kind-
ness,or from any motive whatever relax in any single instance
any of these covenants,without destroying the whole effect
of the stipulations which other people had entered into with
him. For instancein this very case application was made to
the plaintiff for a waiver. It would be monstrous to suppose
if he acceeded to that application,that therefore he was,by
the mere act of kindness to the defendants themselves,destroy-
ing the whole benefit of the covenants 4s to all the rest of
the estate. It appears to me it is impossible to apply the
principle of Roper v Williams and Peek v Matthews to such a
case as this; therefore I think that there is no answer to the
case which the plaintiff has made out,that the intended use of
the property would be a violation of the express covenant
entered into,and the plaintiff is therefore entitled to the
injunction asked'
3. Where there is a material chance in the condition of the
locality. TT re we finc, gs a leading case that of-
Trustees of Columbia College v Thatcher (a). The Court said
that although it had jurisdiction to enforce the observance
of the covenants made by the owner of lands in a city with an
adjoining owner,in consideration of similar reciprocal coven-
antd on the part of the latter,restricting the use of lands to
the purposes of private residences,the exercise of this author-
ity is within its discretion,and where there had been so great
a change in the neighborhood as to defeat the object and pur-
poses of the agreement,such relief would not be granted.
Justice Danforth said "Now having before us a covenant binding
the defendant and his breach of it,if there is nothing more,
the usual result must follow,viz: an injunction to keep within
the terms of the agreement; for the case would come under the
rule laid down in Tipping v Eckersley (2 K & J 264,270),thus,
that if the construction of the instrument be clear and the
breach clear,then it is not a question of damage,but the mere
circumstance of the breach of covenant affords sufficient
ground for the court to interfere by injunction' . . . It
was then,however,suggested that another trial might disclose
objections not before us. . It is now claimed by the appel-
lant,that therehas been such an entire change in the character
of the neighborhood and of the premises,as to defeat the ob-
jects and purpose of the agreement,and that it would be inequi-
table to deptive the defendant of the privilege of conforming
his property to that character,so that he could use it to his
greater advantage,and in no respect to the detriment of the
plaintiff .... If for any reason,therefore,not referable
to the detL ndant,an enforcement of the covenant would defeat
either of the ends contemplated by the parties,a Court of
Equity might well refuse to interfere,or in fact the condit-
ion of the property by which the premises are surrounded has
been so altered that the terms and restrictions of the covenant
are no longer applicable to the existing state of things... .1
and so though the contract was fair and just when madethe
interference of the Court should be denied,if subsequent
events have made performance by the defendant so onerousthat
its enforcement would impose great hardship upon him,and cause
little or no ben-efit to the plaintiff'
CONCLUSION. The result of an examination of the cases
bearing upon the subject of this chapter,seems to lead us to
the conclusion that the action to enforce the restriction
cannot be maintained by parties who were not such to the
original covenant
Firstwhere it appears to the Court that the covenant was not
entered into for the benefit of the land purchased by the
complainant (a).
Second,where it does not appear that the covenant was entered
(a) Renals v CoWlishaw,ll C.D.866
Sharp v Ropes,if0 Mass.381, and cases ante.
into in view of some general scheme for the improvement of the
property which the defendant fails to perform (a)
Third,where it does not appear that the covenant was entered
into for the benefit of subsequent purchasers,and it was only
meant for the benefit of the covenantee and his assigns (b)
Fourth,where the original plan has been abandoned or the
character of the neighborhood has so changed as to defeat the
purpose of the covenant,and thus render its enforcement un-
reasonable (c)
(a) Dana v Iwentworth,lll Mass 291
Beals v Case,138 Mass.140
Badger v Boardman 16 Gray,559.
Parker v Nightingale,6 Allen 341,and cases supra.
(b) Renals v Cowlishaw,9 C.D.125,and cases supra.
(c) Trustees v Thatcher,87 N.Y.311
Ammerman v Dean,30 N.E.741
Peek v Matthews,L.R.3 Eq.515.
Duke of Bedford v Trustees,2 M.&.K.552.
Sayers v Collyer,28 C.D.103.
